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ISSUE PAPER
CHECKS AND BALANCES: EUROPEAN
COMPETITION LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW
Dr. Philip Marsden*

T

he rule of law is an eminently European concept. It may well

have been exported around the world, achieving
constitutional status in some jurisdictions, but it was first
discussed by Aristotle and Plato, formed the basis of the Magna
Carta, has been enunciated by Blackstone and Dicey, and
motivates the thinking of senior Law Lords to this day.' The issue
that this paper seeks to examine is the degree to which European
competition law accords with the rule of law.
Of course, European competition law has evolved within a
system of administrative law that itself only developed over the
past one hundred and fifty years since Dicey set out his
principles. Administrative law acts as a form of constraint on
unbridled discretion by any agency, and can make us less
concerned than we might otherwise be about strict formal
adherence to rule of law principles. Generally, the interplay of
agency expertise, discretion and various checks and balances
inherent in the European competition law system operate quite
well.
The ultimate arbiters of European law - the judges at the
European courts in Luxembourg - recognize that they adjudicate
cases within such a system. That said, they belong to an
important 'European institution,' which may explain why in
some cases the European courts tend to be reluctant to undermine
the position of their sister institutions; particularly the executive the European Commission. Thus, when challenging Commission
decisions in the European courts, there can be a surreal feeling of
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asking the Church to rule on the Church. It is all the more
important then, that even within the structure of European
administrative law, the various guardians of the European
Treaties are acting - and seen to be acting - in accordance with
the fundamental principles of the rule of law.
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
The fundamental issue that the rule of law seeks to
address is: 'Who guards the guardians?' Who ensures that they
use the powers we have granted them to protect us in an
appropriate, just and fair manner, and that we never need to be
protected from them? In the context of competition law, much
centers on the use of both the power and the discretion that we
have given the authorities. Where are the guarantees that they
will be accountable, independent and fair? At the same time, how
do we ensure that the courts accord competition authorities the
appropriate degree of deference due an expert body, while still
holding the authorities to both the acquis communautaire and the
rule of law?
Do we tell a 'noble lie' - as Plato argued - and trust those
in power to guard themselves against themselves? Competition
officials are, after all, experts, and often part of agencies that are
independent from ministries. They are public servants, and will
keep this responsibility well in mind. Wisely, we do not have that
kind of faith. For example, for various reasons over the years,
safeguards have had to be introduced into the decision-making
process at the European Commission's Directorate General for
Competition ("DG-Competition"). As there is no requirement that
the European Union's Competition Commissioner be an expert in
competition law or economics, we rely on the expertise and
analysis of case teams. These are made up of more lawyers and
economists than ever before. Their investigations are in turn
reviewed internally by a 'fresh pair of eyes': colleagues who act as
devil's advocate panels to ensure that the evidence supports the
particular theory of harm. This peer review is also supplemented
by the rigor and skepticism of the Office of the Chief Economist,
which hopefully tempers the fire that we want the case team to
have, with added intellectual rigor and objective analysis. There
is also obviously the to-and-fro between the case teams and the
parties who are obviously directly and highly-interested; added to
which independent Hearing Officers monitor oral proceedings to
'try to ensure both due process and that the rights of defense are
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adequately protected. They are also increasingly getting involved
in more substantive areas. The Legal Service reviews draft
decisions, with an eye on EU law, and the very real pressure that
they may have to defend the decision in court some day. Then
there is the fact that major decisions go to the College of
Commissioners, which, while bowing to the Competition
Commissioner's point of view, also provides another layer of
review. Then there is the possibility to appeal to the Courts, and
the court of public opinion as well: the reporters and the
academic community. After this exhaustive process, are there not
more than enough 'checks and balances' in the system?
Dicey's three principles of the rule of law require:
- the absolute supremacy of the law over arbitrary
power/discretion;
- equality before the law; and
- that the law be defined and enforced by the courts.
How does EU competition law match up to these
standards? The EU acquis is a unique and impressive
achievement: uniting civil and common law regimes through
public international law and applied through a unique form of
administrative law. It tries to bring together different cultures
with different backgrounds, legal traditions, stages of economic
development and concentration, and resulting different views on
competition, wrongdoing and enforcement.
So we must ask, in such a system with such obvious
opportunities for divergent decisions, is EU law indeed supreme?
What is the extent of discretion that we want competition
authorities to exercise and to what extent is it controllable? Is
there sufficient official guidance for undertakings to understand
what conduct is permissible? Are case-selection, re-allocation and
decision-making consistent and accountable? Is the law really
being interpreted and enforced by the courts? Or is it the
authorities that are making the greatest strides in this area? Does
this raise any problems, and if so, how are these controlled?
I will address these areas by looking first at the European
Commission; particularly DG Competition, the European
Competition Network, and finally the EU Courts.
1. The European Commission - lingering procedural
concerns
DG-Competition investigates, prosecutes and decides on
competition law matters, subject to appeal to the courts. The
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various checks and balances outlined above constrain the
discretion of the enforcers, as do detailed regulations.
Since these many safeguards have been introduced,
however, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development ("OECD") has undertaken a peer review of DGCompetition and found that its "integrated enforcement process,
while efficient, has inherent weaknesses".
Previous OECD
reviews had raised "concern about the absence of checks and
balances"! This is curious. One can understand why people
would be concerned when an authority acts as prosecutor, judge,
jury and executioner. But in competition law matters, many
authorities have multiple roles. Only a very few have to convince
a judge of their case - as the United States Department of Justice
does - before enforcement action can be taken. There are ways to
ensure that what might otherwise appear to be intolerable still
accords with fundamental justice, such as, through the kinds of
safeguards that the Commission has introduced as well as
through introducing greater transparency into the system. But
that can only be the start.
The OECD report focused on a few particulars which
make clear that there is still rather a lot of room for improvement.
Generally speaking, these all fall within a category of a greater
'judicializing' of the system. The OECD noted that there was no
right of undertakings to cross-examine witnesses or leniency
applicants. Also, they found the Commission to be the only
competition authority where the ultimate decision-maker - the
College - is not required to attend the oral hearing; nor is the
Competition Commissioner, nor even the Director-General.
Despite all the checks in the system, questions have been raised
about the extent to which this procedure complies with the right
to a fair hearing. Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights holds that rights, obligations and penalties,
particularly those not of a minor nature, should be determined at
first instance by an "independent and impartial tribunal" and a
right to a subsequent review by an appellate body is not enough.
While the OECD recognized that this issue had arisen
before, in the 1980s, it clearly thought it worth re-consideration.
The severity of recent fines, and the fact that they are obviously
punitive, may have played a part. Perhaps the system is
2
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beginning to require a degree of separation of powers and greater
judicial involvement. At the very least, some functions within DG
Competition might be separated, formalizing the division
between the case teams and the devil's advocate panels. Certainly
senior staff - at the Director General or Deputy level - should be
more evident at hearings, if such proceedings are to remain an
important and credible part of the system. Finally, could DGCompetition investigate and prosecute and then bring their
findings to the CFI for review? While it will always be argued
that the EU Courts are over-burdened as it is, perhaps it is time
for them to be more involved. Given the punitive and quasicriminal nature of the penalties, and the fact that almost every
fine gets appealed to the court anyway, perhaps it is time for a
separate chamber to consider such cases, or a separate European
Cartel Court.
2. European Competition Network - time for more
disclosure
The European Competition Network (ECN) was created
by the Modernization Regulation 3 to ensure effective supervision
of European
competition law while simplifying
its
administration. The ECN itself is a mechanism for authorities to
exchange information and reallocate cases. DG-Competition
benefits because it can apply its limited resources to a smaller
caseload; ideally involving a truly European interest. A more
effective and efficient enforcement regime is thus created, and
one which accords more closely with the principle of subsidiarity.
As ever with all things "EU" it is a unique experiment, and one
that seems to be working well.
'Seems' is the operative word, because that is all outsiders
really have to go on. The network is only for the authorities, and
thus is viewed by practitioners as a 'black box'. The "unknown"
naturally attracts suspicion. This is unfortunate because the
principles that guide the ECN are sensible and clearly stated in
Regulation 1/2003. Generally, the Commission deals with cases
affecting more than three EU Member States; the rest go to one
or more Member States, based on which is most affected, with the
Commission reserving the right to take back some multi-State
cases of particular importance, as has happened in the energy and
' Council Regulation 112003, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 4 (EC). (on the
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Article 81 and 82 of
the Treaty).
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telecoms sectors.

Headline results are reported, such as the existence of a
meeting of authorities and possibly the subject matter. Over 800
cases have been notified within the ECN, and more than 300
reported to the Commission. A great deal of knowledge and perhaps more importantly - appreciation for each others'
competences has developed.
As the central node, the Commission is responsible for
maintaining a degree of consistency. So far it has taken a soft
approach, calling authorities, writing letters or submitting amicus
briefs to try to ensure that decisions are broadly consistent with
EU standards.4 This is good and respectful, but it is not going to
catch everything. The process depends primarily on the interests
and resources of the ECN unit at DG-Competition, which has to
monitor more cases in more languages than ever before.
Furthermore, it is not always clear that sufficient reporting from
national courts is reaching the Commission. Inevitably, there has
been divergence, which is to an extent permitted for some aspects
of competition law, particularly abuse of dominance.
Inconsistency at the ECN - at the margins

Resale price maintenance arrangements have been
approved in Spain, but banned in Italy and Holland.' The
infamous Michelin II

rebates scheme

-

that attracted such

opprobrium and penalties at the European level - has been
approved in France. Similarly, British Airways' commissions to
travel agents were banned and fined at the EC level, while cases
involving similar arrangements of BA were closed by the UK
Office of Fair Trading.
Neither the fact that different approaches to abuse cases
are expressly allowed nor the inconsistency that results
necessarily lead to a concern about the rule of law. What is
relevant from that perspective though is how the differences
come about. If it is due to a fundamental and clearly articulated
difference of approach to the practices being examined, then this
Kathryn Wright, European Commission Opinions to National
Courts in Antitrust Cases: Consistent Application and the JudicialAdministrative Relationship, (Ctr. for Competition Policy, Univ. of E. Anglia,
Working Paper No. 08-24).
' Comments of the Global Competition Law Center on the
Functioning
of
Regulation
1/2003
(2008)
available
at
http://www.coleurop.be/news/1412.
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is not just tolerable, but indeed welcome, and can result in
competition among competition regimes that improves decisionmaking. Unfortunately, cases are often closed due to resource
constraints, or after a simple declaration of 'enforcement
priorities'. It is the lack of clarity in this regard, the irritation to
the relevant party whose claim is 'rejected' and the potential for
abuse of such discretion where there may be concern.
The sky is clearly not falling, but different approaches to
cases within Europe do show the limits of the system and the
inevitable uncertainty this provides businesses with panEuropean product offerings. The same is true of the analysis the
authorities use more generally. Of course each authority has
different enforcement priorities, resources, and functions within a
different legal 'operating system; whether it is common law, civil
law or something else. They also function in different markets,
with different degrees of privatization, economic development
and concentration, to name but a few variables. This can lead to
different approaches in the ways authorities define markets,
identify anti-competitive problems, prioritize cases and intervene.
All of this is not surprising in such different economies.
When Articles 81 and 82 EC are enforced, though, consistency is
not necessarily the hobgoblin of mediocre minds. At the very least
a greater effort at transparency would be welcome so we can
understand why divergences are happening. Where it is possible,
historical data from the ECN intranet of cases should be made
public. Equally, authorities should be encouraged to publish nonconfidential versions of non-infringement decisions and any
informal guidance that they issue.
Greater publication of this sort would also save public
resources,be of indirect benefit to business if it can help
authorities with their analysis, and ensure that they do not reinvent the wheel, or reach conflicting conclusions about similar
arrangements. Public statements of reasoning behind all decisions
- including case-closures - will be more effective in 'spreading the
gospel' than relying on the Network operating solely through
internal checks.
What might be nice to see as well though, is some form of
substantive analysis (rather than statistics of cases notified etc.)
on the degree of cooperation and coherence within the ECN.
How have the authorities found working together? Where have
cases been resolved despite different substantive approaches or
priorities? Where have problems arisen and how were they
resolved?
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3. The EU Courts
Recalling Dicey's third principle, there is no doubt that
the EU Courts are the ultimate interpreters of the law. But that
does not mean there are not problems en route to justice. The
main problem is is the length of the journey. Back in 1996, the
European-Court of Justice (ECJ) was found to be largely a victim
of its own success due to its wide jurisdiction, the large volume of
case law upon which it was the sole interpreter and its reputation
for relatively effective enforcement of its judgments.6 Delay is still
the primary problem.7 Cases can take an average of two-and-ahalf to five years, and sometimes eight to nine years from initial
decision to final appeal. This is too long, and various initiatives
have been suggested to speed things up.
Translation issues are still a major factor in the delay, and
it really must be asked whether the court's system of holding
internal deliberations in French, with the necessary translation,
makes sense, where the majority of judges now will have English
as their second language and French as a distant third, if that.
Should there be a separate EU court purely for
competition issues? A House of Lords subcommittee said it was
not yet the right time for such a body.' But something should be
done to give appropriate consideration to what is really such an
important pillar of EU law, and in which quite important
economic interests are at stake. Roving circuit Judges or national
panels of the EU Courts have also been suggested; particularly if
populated by retired members of the ECJ or the EU's Court of
First Instance (CFI). This is certainly a most pragmatic
suggestion, and while it may take a while to set up, and might
mean that some circuits are busier than others, it is worth
consideration.
The most pressing area is always mergers of course, as this
is the most time-sensitive of any aspect of competition law. If a
merger tribunal is not yet timely at the EU level, then we should
BRITISH INST. OF INT'L & COMPARATIVE LAW, "THE
ROLE AND FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE", A
REPORT BY MEMBER OF THE EC SECTION OF THE BRITISH
INSTITUTE'S ADVISORY BOARD CHARED BY THE RT. HON. THE
LORD SLYNN OF HADLEY 23 (1996).
7 Tim Cowen, "JusticeDelayed is Justice Denied': The Rule of Law,
Economic Development and the Future of the European Community Courts", 4
6

EUR. COMPETITION J. 1, 11 (2008).
8 EUR. UNION COMMITTEE,

AN EU COMPETITION COURT
- REPORT WITH EVIDENCE, 2006 - 2007, H.L. Paper 75, at 15.
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explore more ways to free up the CFI in other areas, so that it can
apply its expertise to more quickly rule on mergers. Here again,
consideration might be given to a separate panel or court dealing
solely with relatively straightforward, though no less important,
cartel cases.
Dissents or separate opinions
A word of concern about the role of the courts, though: Of
course they should continue to rule on the most complex and
controversial cases,but how best should they do that? CFI Judge
John Cooke, the Judge Rapporteur in the Microsoft case, recently
revealed, "I tell my clerks that these Article 81 and 82 cases are 20
percent fact, 20 percent law and 60 percent policy".9 We will
never know how much of the case was decided on policy grounds,
rather than on the facts or the law itself. It might be viewed
simply as following EU case law quite closely, but expanding its
scope in some areas to accommodate the Commission's view of
the facts. Or it may be yet another judgment 0 representing an
Ordoliberal view of competition that is also starkly at odds with
the Commission's stated aim of only intervening when there is
clearly identified and likely consumer harm.1" Can we be sure
that the judges understand the economic points being made
before them, and can take an appropriate view; or is it sometimes
all too difficult, and so their default is more often than not to
defer to the Commission? Is that appropriate?
There is no doubt that overturning a Commission decision
- or finding it manifestly unsupported - can deal a severe blow to
the agency. We do not know how much this is in the minds of the
judges, or how much it is discussed in their deliberations.
Hopefully though - and Judge Cook's comments aside, policy
considerations are not determinative, as judgments must rest on
sound and current law first and foremost. Where different
motivations are behind some rulings, however, then this should
be made clear.
Isn't it time to finally allow dissents at the European
Courts? Or at least separate and concurring opinions? The
' See Philip Marsden & Simon Bishop, Intellectual Leaders Still
Need Ground to Stand On, 3.2 EUR. COMPETITION J. 315 (2007).
10 See Case C-95/04, British Airways v Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. I2331.
" "Philip Marsden, 'Microsoft v. Commission - With Great Power
Comes Great Responsibility', COMPETITION LAW INSIGHT 3, 4 (Oct. 2007).
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Commission seems confident in leading the world intellectually
and through cases. The Courts should be too. It is highly unlikely
at this stage that the acquis would be destabilized by learning
more about how judges interpret European law. Judges, who
speak their minds, should not fear national retribution when they
retire. Dissents or separate opinions would help make rulings
more transparent and the reasoning clearer, and help allow new
ideas to be discussed and considered.
The standardof review
The CFI reviews Commission decisions against a
'manifest error of assessment' standard which supposedly entails
ascertaining whether the facts on which the Commission's
assessment was based were correct, whether the conclusions
drawn from those facts were not clearly mistaken or inconsistent
and whether all the relevant factors had been taken into account.
The limited standard of review is of course a deferential bow to
the relevant agency's expertise, the technical and economic issues
at hand and its discretion. But it is not a full appeal; nor even
judicial review.
Is this the appropriate balance of the Commission's
expertise and discretion and the CFI's duty of review? The CFI
has not at all been shy of rebuking DG-Competition when-it has
not argued its cases carefully enough. The three judgments in
Airtours, Tetra Laval, and Schneider "were scathing in their
criticism of the Commission's appreciation of the facts and
treatment of evidence" and eventually forced the Commission to
introduce the very safeguards discussed earlier.12
Nevertheless, it can be argued that in very complex
economic cases, the CFI's limited standard of review leads it to
rely too heavily on the findings of the Commission. There is also
the problem that in the legal tradition of Continental Europe which predominates at the EU Courts - "opinions" and agency
findings can often end up being treated as if they are "facts".
Thus, the Commission's decision might not be as thoroughly
tested as it would be, for example, in a British court.
Given this, do Europeans and others really understand the
12

Case T-342/99 Airtours v. Comm'n 2002 E.R. 11-2585; Case T-

310/01 Schneider Electric v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4071; Case T-5/02 Tetra
Laval v. Comm'n, 2002 ECR 1-4381; See Nicholas Levy, "EU Merger
Control: From Birth to Adolescence", 26 WORLD COMPETITION 195, 211
(2003).
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limited nature of the CFI's review of the Commission's
decisions? The CFI is only looking at the adequacy of the
decision. Judgments are reported as if they were full appeals; as if
a hearing was held of all the issues, -witnesses examined,
arguments heard in full, in a public forum. The reality, of course,
is quite different. There may be Judges' questions - which are
starting to grow in significance - but there is no in-depth
questioning of officials, witnesses, complainants, and the majority
of the work has been done in unavailable written pleadings
which are protected from public scrutiny. More could be opened
up and thereby provide greater oversight. 3 How much more
credibility would the process have if reporters could genuinely
write "today the Court upheld the Commission's decision," rather
than what should be: "today the Court found that the
Commission was not manifestly wrong?"
Conclusion - 'a more economic approach'may lead the way
This article has argued for more openness and more legal
and procedural guarantees. But perhaps the solution will come
from another quarter entirely: the rule of reason. As the
Commission pursues its "more economic approach," it will
inevitably have to explain its decisions more thoroughly; whether
in providing informal guidance, non-infringement decisions or
actual prohibitions. This too will help authorities around Europe
better understand, share and benefit from this self-discipline. It
also means that cases will be more thoroughly reasoned and hardfought, and thus better tested as they pass through theexisting
checks and balances. The recommendation I have made is that
greater disclosure of agencies' reasoning, access to ECN data,
some separation of the investigative and adjudicative functions,
allowing full hearings and dissents, and above all greater
transparency, would all help the continued development of EU
competition law. Ironically though, the reliance on more
economics and balancing tests, like the rule of reason, may be
what allows EU competition law to better accord with the rule of
law. This can only happen, however, if judges are themselves
able and willing to undertake more rigorous evaluation rather
than rely on precedents that were never informed by economic
analysis.
"3 David Lawsky, Information Please: Opening Antitrust to the
Public - Why more European Union Court and Commission Documents and
Hearings Should No Longer Be Secret, 7 ERA FORUM, 411, 412 (2006).

